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NOTES
Biotechnology Law: A Tale of Peptides and Lasers: Is
Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA the End of the

Experimental Use Defense for Biomedical Innovation, or
Does § 271(e)(1) of the Patent Act Save the Day?
L Introduction
One of the great surprises in the wake of the Human Genome Project' was the
discovery that human beings have a mere 30,000 genes 2 rather than the
projected 100,000. 3 On its face, the finding implies an easier path toward
understanding the molecular processes of the body. However, the reality is that
genes and the proteins they encode are intimately tied together in complex
pathways.' The complexity of the pathways demands research efforts that are
diverse and interconnected through shared tools and data. Yet, advances in
biotechnology patent law and the trend toward commercialization of biomedical
research run counter to the need for open access to research data.' The
1. The Human Genome Project (HGP) represented a publicly funded, joint effort of
academic scientists to completely decipher the human genetic code. A parallel effort took place
within the private sector at Celera Genomics. The first draft of the human genome was released
in 2000 following a ceremony with President William J. Clinton at the White House. See
generally U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, HUMAN GENOME PROJECT, at http://www.ornl.gov/scil
techresources/Human_Genome/home.html (last visited June 30, 2004).
2. The genetic code is located within the chromosomes of each cell and is comprised of
discrete units of deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) sequence referred to as genes. STEDMAN'S
MEDICAL DICTIONARY

459 (26th ed. 1995). DNA is a four-letter code of adenine, guanine,

cytosine, and thymine that functions to direct the cellular machinery to produce proteins
according to the code. Id. For more in-depth information, see JAMES D. WATSON ET AL.,
RECOMBINANT DNA 13-14 (2d ed. 1992).
3. The central dogma of molecular biology until the HGP was that one gene would code
for one protein; therefore, human beings would need approximately 100,000 individual genes
to account for the complexity of the species. Upon completion of the final draft of the human
sequence in 2002, however, it was apparent that the dogma was incorrect and that approximately
30,000 genes were present in the human genome. See Eric S. Lander et al., Initial Sequencing
and Analysis of the Human Genome, 409 NATURE 860 (2002); Craig Venter et al., The
Sequence of the Human Genome, 291 SCIENCE 1434 (2002).
4. For example, one gene may code for a variety of protein derivatives with alternate
functions, and proteins may function in multiple combinatorial pathways. WATSON, supra note
2, at 135.
5. A major effort is currently underway in academic science to provide for "open access"
to all public domain information. The present focus of this effort is to publish peer-reviewed
data in open-journal formats that are not controlled by copyright laws and major publisher
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balancing of innovation and incentive in patent law has taken center stage in the
battle over the experimental use of patented research tools, particularly with
respect to the development of new pharmaceutical agents based on genetic
information and technologies.
This note focuses on Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA,6 a 2003
decision that effectively extinguished the experimental use defense. This note
also discusses the need for Congress to harmonize its terminology and goals, and
to legislate to protect scientists' open access to biotechnology tools. Part II of
this note traces the historic roots of the experimental use defense and the
development of the current de minimis interpretation. Additionally, Part II
illustrates the experimental use defense in patent infringement actions, and the
tension that exists between academic and commercial molecular biology. Part
H further discusses the advent of the "safe harbor" provision that Congress
drafted to codify a narrow version of the experimental use defense.7 Part I
introduces Integra, the most recent Federal Circuit decision to speak
emphatically regarding the limitations of both the experimental use exception
and the safe harbor provision of the Hatch-Waxman Act.8 Part IV examines the
majority and dissenting opinions of Integra, the underlying split in their
rationales, and the fundamental misunderstandings that occur when complicated
scientific research enters a courtroom. Part V analyzes how Integra affects
biotechnology as a whole and the future implications of the decision. Finally,
Part V proposes that Congress should extend the safe harbor provision to
achieve the most efficient use of modem biotechnological advancements.
II. HistoricalPerspective
The U.S. Constitution specifically mandates that Congress actively
participate in the advancement of science through the granting of patent rights
to inventors of useful arts.' This constitutional authority speaks to the
importance of innovation in American society. Under U.S. patent laws, 10 a
patent owner not only has the exclusive right to prevent others from selling the

consortiums. See, e.g., BIOMEDCENTRAL, at http://www.biomedcentral.com/openaccess (last
visited June 30, 2004) (providing a variety of online journals); see also PUBLIC LIBRARY OF
SCIENCE, at http://www.publiclibraryofscience.org (last visited June 30, 2004).
6. 331 F.3d 860 (Fed. Cir. 2003).

7. 35 U.S.C. § 371(e) (2000).
8. Id.
9. Specifically, Congress is authorized "[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings and Discoveries." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
10. See generally 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-376.
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invention for commercial gain, but also the right to prevent unauthorized use of
the invention." Patent infringement is the use of a patented invention without
license from the patent owner.' 2 Unauthorized users of a patented invention are
subject to civil liability.' 3 In general, the intent of the infringing party is
irrelevant, and damages are automatic upon a finding of infringement.' 4 In rare
circumstances, however, courts have allowed a narrow exception when the use
of the patented invention falls under the guise of "experimental use."'"
A. The Experimental Use Defense: A Common Law Creation
Neither the U.S. Constitution nor the Patent Act' 6 mentions an exemption for
experimental use. Nevertheless, common law provides a defense to patent
infringement claims where the use of a patented invention is for
experimentation or research, and profit is neither a motive nor a purpose for the
use.' 7 This defense originated in Justice Story's opinion in Whittemore v.
Cutter.'8 In Whittemore, Justice Story reasoned that the constitutional framers
could not have intended to allow a patent to exclude others from using the
patented inventions for purposes of curiosity.' 9 He further argued that "it could
never have been the intention of the legislature to punish a man, who
constructed such a machine merely for philosophical experiments,2 ° or for the
purpose of ascertaining the sufficiency of the machine to produce its described
effects." 2 Because the defendant used the patented machine for the production
of game cards without profiting, Justice Story noted that the jury instruction

11. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a). "[W]hoever without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells
any patented invention, within the United States... during the term of the patent, therefor,
infringes the patent." Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Blair v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 291 F. Supp. 664,670 (D.D.C. 1968) (finding that
"[i]t is, of course, elementary, that an infringement may be entirely inadvertent and
unintentional and without knowledge of the patent").
15. See 5 DONALD CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 16.03 (2003).
16. 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-376.

17. 5 CHISUM, supra note 15, § 16.03[1].
18. 29 F. Cas. 1120 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813) (No. 17,600).
19. Id. at 1121.
20. The reference to philosophy relates to the modem term of natural sciences and comes
from the concept of natural philosophy. "At the time the defense first appeared in the courts,
'science' was a term that encompassed human knowledge or learning in general, and 'natural
philosophy' or 'experimental philosophy' was the discipline that systematically investigated
natural phenomena." KENNETH J. BURCHFIEL, BIOTECHNOLOGY AND THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT
§ 15.1, at 349 (1995).
21. Whittemore, 29 F. Cas. at 1121.
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requiring profit from the making and use of the patented technology favored a
finding of noninfringement.2 2 This early articulation of the experimental use
defense, largely in dicta, could hardly foreshadow the difficulty courts would
face in defining "experimentation."
Early cases articulating the experimental use defense, and the handful of
cases that applied the defense before the modem era, focused on whether the
experimental use of an invention was directly or indirectly for the purpose of
seeking a profit.23 For example, in Sawin v. Guild,2 4 Justice Story held that the
making of a machine is not infringement unless it is "the making with the intent
to use [the machine] for profit, and not for the mere purpose of philosophical
experiment."25 Courts typically held that a use or making fell outside the realm
of a "philosophical experiment" when an underlying intent to profit from the
experiment was established.26 At least one scholar has suggested that Justice
Story originally conceived a broad experimental use defense that would protect
any "philosophical experiment," which most likely included "basic scientific
research employing a patented invention."27
The common law origin of the experimental use defense has left the
exception vulnerable to attack by evolving technology and judicial perspectives.
In Roche Productsv. BolarPhannaceuticalCo.,28 the Federal Circuit addressed
the application of the experimental use defense to the infringement of a patented
pharmaceutical product. The defendant, Bolar Pharmaceutical, attempted to
bring a generic version of a popular Roche sleeping pill into the market on
expiration of Roche's patent. 29 Bolar deliberately used the patented drug for
premarket testing of its generic equivalent to gain quicker approval from the

22. Id.
23. See Dugan v. Lear Avia, Inc., 55 F. Supp. 223,229 (S.D.N.Y. 1944) (declining to find
infringement of a device that was clearly manufactured for experimental purposes and not
offered for sale); Akro Agate Co. v. Master Marble Co., 18 F. Supp. 305, 333 (N.D. W. Va.
1937) (finding that the defendant's use of the patented marble production apparatus was merely
experimental, and further that no marbles were sold using the patented marble production, thus,
infringement was excused).
24. 21 F. Cas. 554 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813) (No. 12,391).
25. Id. at 555.
26. See, e.g., Poppenhusen v. N.Y. Gutta Percha Comb Co., 19 F. Cas. 1059 (C.C.S.D.N.Y.
1858) (No. 11,283) (finding that the experimental use defense was not applicable because the
use was for business purposes in that it was specifically in competition with the defendant's
product). But see Ruth v. Stearns-Roger Mfg. Co., 13 F. Supp. 697 (D. Colo. 1935) (holding
that use of patented parts in flotation devices was not infringement under the experimental use
defense).
27. BURCHFIEL, supra note 20, § 15.1, at 352.
28. 733 F.2d 858 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
29. U.S. Patent No. 3,299,053 (issued Jan. 17, 1967).
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Food and Drug Administration (FDA). 30 To justify its patent infringement,
Bolar raised the experimental use defense.' Bolar conceded, however, that its
use did "not fall within the traditional limits of the experimental use
exception. 32 The court agreed and refused to extend the exception to cover
such for-profit use. The court found the "experimental use exception to be truly
narrow" and not applicable to infringing use for the purpose of bringing a
competing product to market. 33 In its reasoning, the court stated, "We cannot
construe the experimental use rule so broadly as to allow a violation of the
patent laws in the guise of 'scientific inquiry,' when that inquiry has definite,
cognizable, and not insubstantial commercial purposes."' 4 Accordingly, the
court recognized the experimental use defense, but only as a very narrow
exception applicable in the' absence of commercial purposes.35
Embrex, Inc. v. Service Engineering Corp.36 further narrowed the
experimental use defense when the court held that the defendant's infringing use
of patented egg inoculation methods to test its own automated egg injection
machine was outside of the narrow confines of the experimental use defense.37
The Embrex court reasoned that "[w]hile [defendant] tries to cloak these tests
in the guise of scientific inquiry, that alone cannot immunize its acts." 38 Perhaps
the most important aspect of the Embrex decision is the foreshadowing by
concurring Judge Rader, who suggested that if the experimental use defense
continued to exist, even a slight commercial interest would nullify the doctrine's

30. Roche Prods., 733 F.2d at 860.
31. ld. at 862.
32. Id. at 863 (internal quotations omitted).
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Bolar also made a public policy argument that such use should be allowed in the interest
of bringing safe generic drug alternatives into the market on expiration of patents. Id.
Essentially, if a generic drug maker was forced to wait until after the expiration of the patent to
test the effectiveness of the generic against the original drug, the patent holder would receive
a de facto extension of the patent term. The Federal Circuit soundly rejected this argument as
something within the legislature's realm. Id. at 863-64. Congress reacted swiftly to address this
problem through the "safe harbor" provision of the Hatch-Waxman Act, which authorized the
use of patented items during the patent term for the specific purpose of acquiring FDA approval.
Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417, § 202,
98 Stat. 1585, 1603 (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 27 1(e) (2000)).
36. 216 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
37. Id. at 1349.
38. Id. (finding that the hiring of scientists to test the vaccine injection method was not to
be "deemed experimental use or de minimis" for the purposes of avoiding infringement
liability).
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application to infringement.39 Judge Rader further opined that the experimental
use defense garners no support in the Patent Act.'
B. The Exception Nears Extinction in Madey v. Duke University4
In the mid-1980s, Dr. John Madey was a research scientist in charge of a
physics research program at Duke University.42 He owned two patents for free
electron laser instrumentation, which was the core technology of the laser
research facility.4 3 When Dr. Madey's employment with Duke terminated, the
laser lab continued to use the patented technology for research projects of other
scientists at Duke.' Consequently, Dr. Madey brought suit against Duke for
patent infringement because of Duke's continuing use of the laser facility, which
45
he had developed with his patented laser technology.
Duke raised the experimental use defense in response to allegations that it
infringed on Dr. Madey's patents, and the district court granted Duke's motion
for summaryjudgment. 4 The court referred to the "debate over the scope of the
experimental use defense" and cited Embrex as allowing the defense when the
use was purely for experimental, nonprofit purposes. 47 The court found Dr.
Madey' s argument that Duke was engaged in business through "obtaining grants
and developing possible commercial applications for the fruits of 'academic
research' unconvincing and instead focused on the university's primary
function as a place of education for "the expansion of knowledge."48 The court
concluded that Dr. Madey failed to meet his burden of proof that Duke's use of
the laser technology fell outside of the experimental use defense.49
On appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit,50 Dr. Madey
argued that the district court erroneously broadened the scope of the

39. Id. at 1353 (Rader, J., concurring).
40. Id.
41. 307 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 539 U.S. 958 (2003).
42. Id. at 1352.
43. U.S. Patent No. 4,641,103 (issued Feb. 3, 1987); U.S. Patent No. 5,130,994 (issued
July 14, 1982).
44. Madey, 307 F.3d at 1353.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 1355.
47. Id. (citing Embrex, Inc. v. Serv. Eng'g Corp., 216 F.3d 1343, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2000)).
48. Id. at 1356 (paraphrasing Madey v. Duke Univ., No. 1:97CV1170, 1999 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 21379, at **19-20 (M.D.N.C. Dec. 1, 1999)).
49. Dr. Madey also presented evidence that Duke intended to allow "for-fee" use of the
laser research facility, but the court did not consider this as "for-profit" use. Id.
50. Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, § 127(a), 96 Stat. 25,
37 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (2000)) (creating the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit in an attempt to standardize patent, copyright, and trademark law).
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experimental use defense and based its decision on general propositions rather
than facts.5 The appellate court agreed, concluding that "the experimental use
'5 2 Furthermore, the court reasoned
defense persists albeit in very narrow fonn.
that the university's use of the patented technology, even if not directly for53
profit, could still be for commercial purposes. In an opinion that frightened
5 4 the Federal Circuit announced that it
academic institutions across the country,
was possible for courts to identify commercial interests sufficient to defeat the
experimental use defense where the "projects also serve... to increase the status
55
of the institution and lure lucrative research grants, students and faculty." The
Madey decision summarized the state of the experimental use defense as
follows:
[R]egardless of whether a particular institution or entity is engaged
in an endeavor for commercial gain, so long as the act is in
furtherance of the alleged infringer's legitimate business and is not
solely for amusement, to satisfy idle curiosity, or for strictly
philosophical inquiry, the act does not qualify for the very narrow
and strictly limited experimental use defense. Moreover, the profit
56
or non-profit status of the user is not determinative.
In analyzing the legitimate business of an institution engaged in biomedical
research, it appears that any use of patented tools by researchers and faculty
engaged in the constant pursuit of funding, whether in the form of research
grants or licensing arrangements for inventions developed at the institution, is
unlikely to be experimental use.57 If commercial gain exists in a research
endeavor, few, if any, institutions will meet the strict requirements necessary to
escape patent infringement liability through application of the experimental use
defense.58 In essence, Madey apparently extinguished the experimental use
51. Madey, 307 F.3d at 1361.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 1362.
54. See, e.g., S. Peter Ludwig & Jason D. Chumney, No Roomfor Experiment: The Federal
Circuit'sNarrow Constructionof the Experimental Use Defense, 21 NAT. BIOTECH. 453 (2003);
Peg Brickley, Document Your Use of PatentedTools, SCIENTIST, Aug. 25, 2003, at 65.
55. Madey, 307 F.3d at 1362.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. The Madey court remanded the case to the district court with instructions to focus on
whether Duke's technology transfer policy on patent and licensing was evidence of a clear
commercial interest despite supposed educational-only goals. Id. at 1363 n.7. Technology
transfer policies and offices are now a major effort in all research institutions, largely because
of the Bayh-Dole Act, which authorizes the patenting of technologies developed through federal
funding. 35 U.S.C. § 202 (2000). The Act paved the way for researchers in academic facilities
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defense because it is difficult to imagine any type of research that could pass the
strict test articulated in Madey.59
C. Congress Carves Out a Limited Legislative Experimental Use Defense
In an effort to overrule Roche,' Congress passed a legislative "safe harbor"
for the experimental use of patented pharmaceuticals as part of the HatchWaxman Act.6' The relevant provision of 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) addresses a
research lab's need to test pharmaceuticals to receive FDA approval so that the
lab may bring the drug, presumably a generic version, to market.6 2 Section
271 (e)(1) provides that "[ilt shall not be an act of infringement to make, use or
sell ... a patented invention ... solely for uses reasonably related to the
development and submission of information under a Federal law which
regulates the manufacture, use or sale of drugs."63 As Justice Scalia opined in
Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc.,6 §271 (e)(1) "allows competitors, prior to the
expiration of a patent, to engage in otherwise infringing activities necessary to
obtain regulatory approval. ' 65 The parameters of the safe harbor provision
continue to develop parallel with the complexities of biotechnology patenting.

to capitalize on their own inventions rather than face the question of whether to stay in academic
science. The Act, however, has also created complicated situations, such as the question
presented in Madey, where the court addressed whether a research institution's attainment of
patents automatically qualifies as a commercial endeavor. For more discussion of the
consequences of the Bayh-Dole Act on academic science, see Arti K. Rai & Rebecca S.
Eisenberg, The Public Domain: Bayh-Dole Reform and the Progressof Biomedicine, 66 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROB. 289 (2003).
59. See generally Jennifer Miller, Sealing the Coffin on the Experimental Use Exception,
2003 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 12 (2003).
60. Roche Prods. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 733 F.2d 858 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
61. Congress intended the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of
1984 (also known as the Hatch-Waxman Act) to overrule the Roche decision. 35 U.S.C.
§ 271(e)(1). The purpose of the Act was to "establish that experimentation with a patented
drug, when the purpose is to prepare for commercial activity which will begin after a valid
patent expires, is not patent infringement." H.R. REP. No. 98-857, at 45 (1984), reprintedin
1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2647, 2678.
62. See generally Phillip B.C. Jones, Navigating the Hatch-Waxman Act's Safe Harbor,
57 FOOD DRUG L.J. 475 (2002) (discussing the history and implications of § 271(e)(1) as an
escape hatch for would-be infringers).
63. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1).
64. 496 U.S. 661 (1990) (expanding the scope of the safe harbor provision to include
medical devices).
65. Id. at671.
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D. Culture Clash: Biotechnology Versus Academic Science and the Trend
Toward Open Access Science
As the Madey decision echoed in academic research labs across the country,
the Federal Circuit was evidently willing to assume that all basic research had
ties to commercial incentives. The appellate court, however, chose to ignore the
traditional motivations of a researcher - such as scientists' personal curiosity
or desire to expand their knowledge. Yet, science had been evolving toward
commerce in the modem biotech era, and it was perhaps this metamorphosis that
disquieted the academic community. Undoubtedly all research labs, even those
clearly for profit, are engaged in the pursuit of knowledge that will better
humankind. However, the modem research lab, particularly where molecular
biology takes a primary role, is an extremely expensive endeavor that requires
a steady stream of grants and other financial support. Consequently, when
scientists develop technology with true commercial potential, the best interest
of the lab, the institute, and society are served by seeking patent and licensing
rights. Whether this sort of financial support is enough to convert an academic
research lab into a for-profit business lies at the core of the Madey decision.
In addition to the Madey decision, the influx of biotechnology patents into
academic research also creates problems surrounding a scientist's ability to
openly communicate and verify scientific data. Rather than bring their findings
to light at the earliest possible time either through presentations at scientific
meetings or publications in peer-reviewed journals, scientists now remain silent
about their findings until a patent attorney or business partner approves the
information for release to the public. 66 More significantly, the sharing of data
and research tools has become nearly impossible in an era of patents and
royalties, though only ten years earlier, scientists commonly shared plasmids,
67
peptides, or antibodies with other scientists working in the same field. Such
sharing now requires a careful analysis of whether applicable licensing and
competitive issues are at stake, which includes the drafting of time-consuming
and complex material transfer agreements. The commercial success of
66. See Ted Agres, The Costs of CommercializingAcademic Research: Does University
Licensing Impede Life Science Research andDevelopment?, SCIENTIST, Aug. 25, 2003, at 58.
67. Plasmids are nonnuclear segments of DNA genetically engineered to contain a gene of
interest for expression in bacterial, mammalian, or other host systems. STEDMAN'S MEDICAL
DICTIONARY 1377 (26th ed. 1995). Peptides are segments of proteins often used for eliciting
cellular responses or for blocking the binding of natural proteins to the cellular surface. Id. at
1323.
Antibodies are the proteins produced by the immune system in response to a variety of
extracellular pathogens and environmental triggers. Id. at 99-100. Antibodies have a wide
variety of uses in research labs, both as reagents and as end-product therapeutics. Id.
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biotechnology has the unfortunate side effect of hampering the progress of
science in academic labs; it also creates problematic conflicts of interest with
other researchers, participants in research studies, and society at large.68
Ill.Statement of the Case: IntegraLifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA69
Given the near-death experience of the experimental use defense, the
confusion surrounding exactly how to apply the Hatch-Waxman "safe harbor"
provision, and the tensions existing within academic labs in a biotechnology age,
it was inevitable that a case would develop that allowed the Federal Circuit to
tackle all of these issues. Integrabecame that case.7"
A. FactualBasis: Peptides,Patents,and Participantsin a Research
Endeavor
The patents at issue in Integra were directed toward short segments of
fibronectin, an extremely important protein for the communication and adhesion
between neighboring cells of human tissues. 7' Fibronectin promotes cellular
growth and attachment through interaction with cell surface receptors, which
send biochemical signals to the intracellular machinery indicating that either
more or less growth activity is warranted in a given cellular neighborhood.72
The active site of the fibronectin protein where it contacts the receptor is a short
sequence of three amino acids, arginine-glycine-aspartic acid (RGD).73

68. For an interesting case that focuses on the conflict of interest between research
participants and the researcher engaged in finding a genetic cause for their disease, see
Greenberg v. Miami Children's HospitalResearch Institute, 264 F. Supp. 2d 1064 (S.D. Fla.
2003), which granted the research institute's motion to dismiss in part. The court found that the
plaintiffs failed to state a claim because the researcher did not reveal an intent to patent the
Cavanaugh gene in the event it could be identified. Id. at 1077.
69. 331 F.3d 860 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
70. The majority and dissenting opinions sharply disagree on the application of the
experimental use defense in this case. Nevertheless, the two opinions provide insight into the
state of the law for the infringement of research tool patents in the name of experimental use.
71. U.S. Patent Nos. 4,789,734 (issued Dec. 6, 1988); 4,792,525 (issued Dec. 20, 1988);
4,879,237 (issued Nov. 7, 1989); 4,988,621 (issued Jan. 29, 1991); and 5,695,997 (issued Dec.
9, 1997).
72. Specifically, fibronectin interacts with the avP3 family of integrins, which are
important proteins in inflammation and wound healing. These surface receptors are upstream
molecules in a cascade of intracellular signal transduction pathways that regulate the growth and
life cycle of the cell. When fibronectin engages the integrin receptor, a molecular signal is sent
to the nucleus of the cell and an appropriate response is initiated. See generally WILLIAM E.
PAUL, FUNDAMENTAL IMMUNOLOGY 564-73 (4th ed. 1999).
73. The cell responds to the short RGD peptide in the same manner that it would to the full
length fibronectin protein. The short peptides are more stable and effective to use in the
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Integra's patents involved recombinantly produced RGD peptides and
associated technical uses for the peptides.74 The patents covered the production
of pharmaceuticals to promote wound healing and blood vessel growth through
infusion of RGD peptides, which stimulate cell growth and adhesion.75 The
patents also covered the potential use of the peptides in common laboratory
practices associated with growing cells in tissue culture.76
During the time Integra was obtaining its patents, Dr. David Cheresh, a
pioneering academic scientist in the field of cellular adhesion and signal
transduction, was working independently at Scripps Research Institute on
research involving the molecular mechanisms of integrins, the receptors for
fibronectin." Dr. Cheresh's research revealed that blocking the receptors
inhibited the process of blood vessel development - a method that would
potentially stop tumor growth by starving tumor cells.78 Dr. Cheresh blocked
integrin binding and cell activation with antibodies engineered to bind to the
active site of the integrin molecule that would normally be bound by the RGD
peptide. Further, Dr. Cheresh discovered the cyclical RGD peptide's use in
blocking integrin activation.79 Consequently, Merck, a leading pharmaceutical

research lab, or as a potential therapeutic. RGD peptides are classic research tools used by a
wide variety of research labs studying diverse areas of interest, such as gene therapy vector
development (one family of which is based on Adenovirus, which binds to avP3 integrins),
signal transduction research, which attempts to decipher the downstream pathways, and cell
adhesion research. Id. In essence, fibronectin protein is the "key" that unlocks a cell's growth
potential. The RGD peptide represents a short piece ofthe whole protein, similar to the grooves
of a key that allow the lock to recognize the key.
74. As an example, the '237 patent owned by Integra covers a method for the "use of
peptides in control of cell attachment and detachment." U.S. Patent No. 4,879,237 (issued Nov.
7, 1989).
75. Id.
76. See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 4,988,621 (issued Jan. 29, 1991) (describing the industrial
application of the invention for the "production of cell lines for research" and the production
of end-product therapeutics).
77. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 331 F.3d 860, 863 (Fed. Cir. 2003). As
previously noted supra note 73, integrin molecules are the "locks" opened by the
fibronectin/RGD "key."
78. Dr. Cheresh has published extensively on all aspects of integrin function and
characterization. See, e.g., P.C. Brook et al., Anti-Integrin avfl3 Blocks Human Breast Cancer
Growth and Angiogenesis in Human Skin, 96 J. CLIN. INVEST. 1815 (1995) (describing the
results of research conducted with antibodies that block the activation of integrin receptors
leading to a reversal of breast cancer cell growth).
79. Robert A. Orlando & David A. Cheresh, Arginine-Glycine-Aspartic Acid Binding
Leading to MolecularStabilizationBetween Integrin av33 and Its Ligand,266 J. BIOL. CHEM.
19,543 (1991) (describing research that revealed the manner of RGD peptide binding to
integrins).
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company, became interested in collaborating with Dr. Cheresh on a project to
(1) develop potential cancer therapeutics, and (2) perform the necessary testing
for approval to proceed with clinical trials.8" The Merck-Scripps research
focused on a variety of Merck-synthesized cyclical RGD peptides, each tested
for efficacy against antibody blocking and traditional RGD peptides in growth
inhibition studies. 8'
Upon learning of the Merck-Scripps agreement, Integra offered to license its
patented RGD technology to Merck; however, Merck declined.82 Although
Integra had never actually developed pharmaceuticals with its patented
technology, it brought an infringement action against Dr. Cheresh, Scripps
Research Institute, and Merck for their allegedly infringing study of
angiogenesis and RGD peptides.83
B. ProceduralHistory
Integra sought monetary damages for Merck's infringement and declaratory
judgment against Dr. Cheresh and Scripps.' Without explanation, the district
court granted a motion to dismiss the declaratory judgment action against Dr.
Cheresh and Scripps. 5 The court, however, held Merck liable for infringing on
four RGD patents, despite Merck's argument that its activities fell under the safe
harbor provision of § 271(e)(1). 86 The court also denied Merck's motion for
judgment as a matter of law, in which Merck asserted that the experiments were
exempt from infringement.87 Merck appealed to the Federal Circuit, where
Merck again raised the § 271 (e)(1) defense. Integra also appealed the denial of
its motion for declaratory judgment against Dr. Cheresh and Scripps.88

80. Integra Lifesciences, 331 F.3d at 863.
81. Dr. Cheresh listed the purposes of the Merck-Scripps agreement as follows: "(1)
[A]ssess the potential efficacy of the peptides as therapeutic agents; (2) discover the mechanism
of action of the peptides; and (3) shed lighton histopathology, toxicology, circulation, diffusion,
and half life of the peptides in the bloodstream." Id. at 874 (Newman, J., dissenting) (quoting
Appellant's Brief at 15).
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 863.
85. Id. at 874. This leads to speculation that, at least as far as individual academic scientists
and their institutes are concerned, there may be a viable experimental use defense at work.
86. Id. at 864.
87. Id.
88. Id.
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C. Issue: If the Experimental Use Defense Does Not Survive Madey v. Duke,
Does § 271(e)(1) Create an Exemption from Infringementfor Pre-Clinical
Research?
The precise question presented in Integra was "whether the pre-clinical
research conducted under the Scripps-Merck agreement [was] exempt from
liability for infringement of Integra's patents under Section 271 (e)(1)."89 The
majority and dissenting opinions differed sharply regarding whether the
traditional experimental use defense was raised as an issue in this case.9" While
the dissent would apply the experimental use defense, the majority focused
intently on the application of the safe harbor provision and addressed whether
the provision "reache[d] back down the chain of experimentation to embrace
development
and identification of new drugs that will, in turn, be subject to FDA
9
approval." 1
Section 271 (e)(1) immunity requires that the activities be "reasonably related
to the development and submission of information" to the FDA.9" Merck argued
that it was developing its own FDA-compliant pharmaceutical drug directed
toward cancer therapy and that the use of the patented RGD peptide technology
comprised part of the testing process. 93 Thus, the question before the Federal
Circuit was whether such use was reasonably related, as required by § 271 (e)(1).
D. Holding: Neither the Experimental Use Defense Nor Statutory
Construction of the Safe HarborProvisionAre Consistentwith the ScrippsMerck Research Use of RGD Peptides
Writing for the majority,94 Judge Rader found that Merck's research in
developing its own novel drug using RGD peptide technology constituted
activity that was too far removed from the intent of the safe harbor provision to
enjoy its protection.95 The court reasoned that, instead of providing a means to
develop novel drugs, the express objective of the provision was to allow for
rapid development and marketing of generic versions of pioneer drugs as they

89. Id. at 865.
90. See infra Part V, which discusses the tension between Judge Rader and Judge Newman
in Integra.
91. Integra Lifesciences, 331 F.3d at 865-66.
92. 35 U.S.C. § 271 (e)(1) (2000).
93. Integra Lifesciences, 331 F.3d at 865-66.
94. Recall that Judge Rader previously expressed strong feelings that experimental use
should not exist as a defense to infringement. See Embrex, Inc. v. Serv. Eng'g Corp., 216 F.3d
1343, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
95. Integra Lifesciences, 331 F.3d at 867.
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began to lose patent protection.96 Judge Rader opined that to find that Merck's
research fell within the exception would require "exaggerating Section 271 (e)(1)
out of context [which] would swallow the whole benefit of the Patent Act for
some categories of biotechnological inventions."97 Accordingly, .the court
upheld the lower court's infringement finding against Merck9 8 and carved out
a damages calculation based on Merck's use of the RGD peptides as research
tools. 99

IV. The Three Judge Panel of the FederalCircuitSplits Sharply in Analyzing
Application of the Experimental Use Defense and the § 271(e)(1) "Safe
Harbor"Provision
Judge Newman's dissenting opinion takes a different look at the facts and
issues of the case.'0° For Judge Newman, 'The question [was] whether, and to
what extent, the patentee's permission [was] required in order to study that
which is patented."'O' In her opinion, the majority erroneously found that the
research was beyond the scope of the experimental use defense or statutory
immunity of § 271(e)(1)."°2 From her perspective, the research fell squarely
within either the experimental use defense or § 271 (e)(1) and, as such, Merck's
"activities were either exempt from or immune from infringement."' 10 3
V. Analysis: Integra Highlightsthe Debate Over the Use ofResearch Tools
and the Limitationsof the Experimental Use Defense
At times, the Integra opinion looks more like an academic debate than a
judicial opinion, reflecting the larger controversy concerning the appropriate
way to manage patents that result from biomedical research advances. The
intensity of the opinion not only draws attention to the court's split over the
issue, but also illustrates that the court lacks guidance for interpreting
experimental use.

96. Id. at 866-67.
97. Id. at 867.
98. The majority found Integra's arguments, which sought reversal of the dismissal of the
declaratory judgment motions against Scripps and Cheresh, unpersuasive. Id. at 872.
99. Id. at 870-73 (instructing the lower court to implement the damages calculation upon
remand).
100. Id. at 872 (Newman, J., dissenting) (stating that contrary to the majority's findings,
"This case raises a question of the nature and application of the common law research
exemption.").
101. Id. at 872-73.
102. Id. at 873.
103. Id. at 878.
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A. A Needfor ClearerUnderstandingof What It Means to Be a "Research
Tool"
A modem research lab depends on a variety of research tools. In 1998, the
National Institutes of Health (NIH) focused on the twin problems of defining
and sharing research tools and highlighted the issue as a matter of perspective. "
To a scientist, research tools are essential to growing cell lines, testing
antibodies, and sequencing DNA samples. °5 Research tools are the reagents,
machines, and techniques that make science function. However, as
demonstrated by Integra,the legal meaning of research tools appears imprecise
at best.
1. Exactly What Is in the Research Toolbox?
Despite NIH's attempt to define research tools as those things "that scientists
use,"'" the precise definition of research tool remains difficult to decipher in the
research lab context. RGD peptides, however, are widely recognized as
"research tools" in diverse areas of investigation and are readily available in
laboratory freezers across the country.
The five patents at issue in Integra were all directed toward technology
associated with RGD peptides. The patents described ways in which the
peptides could be used to make cell line maintenance easier or to discover novel
receptors. The inventions claimed in the Integra patents could easily be
categorized as either technology or research tools. However, "[O]ne
institution's research tool may be another institution's end product."' 7
2. The Majority Creates a Solution Based on the Hypothetical Cash Value
of Tools in the Toolbox
Part of the majority's rationale for restricting the reach of § 271(e)(1)
immunity was that the provision would detrimentally affect biotechnology.'
Allowing Merck to use Integra's patented peptide technology to develop its own
cancer therapeutic "would effectively vitiate the exclusive right of patentees

104. REPORT OF THE NIH WORKING GROUP ON RESEARCH TooLs, at http://www.nih.govl
news/researchtools (last visited June 30, 2004).
105. NIH has formally defined research tools as those things "that scientists use in the
laboratory. ...[including] cell lines, monoclonal antibodies, reagents, animal models, growth
factors, combinatorial chemistry and DNA libraries, clones and cloning tools (such as PCR),
methods, laboratory equipment and machines." Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Integra Lifesciences, 331 F.3d at 867.

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2004

396

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 57:381

owning biotechnology tool patents. After all, patented tools facilitate general
research to identify candidate drugs, as well as downstream safety-related
experiments on those new drugs."'" By viewing the Integra technology as a
research tool, the majority sought to prevent the loss of incentive to develop
technical innovations that facilitate research by refusing to allow the safe harbor
provision to "swallow the whole benefit of the Patent Act for some categories
of biotechnological inventions."" 0
Arguably, this shortsighted perspective fails to acknowledge the work of
academic scientists who develop research tools without any intent to patent the
innovation. The vast majority of biomedical researchers work with an eye
toward solving intellectual questions regarding how things work; thus, they care
little if financial profits are involved. The researcher works for the incentive of
publication, tenure, and recognition in their field, not for maximum patent
protection.
When a particular tool is necessary for a researcher's
experimentation, researchers usually contact colleagues, who are willing to
share. However, under a license-requiring patented tool scheme that collects
royalties and places restrictions on publication, the effectiveness of research
decreases, and the general expansion of common knowledge is hindered.
Ultimately, valuable vaccines, treatments, and cures are lost because the
research becomes cost prohibitive.
While refusing to acknowledge that use of a research tool could be an act of
noninfringement under the common law defense or the statutory safe harbor
provision, the majority found that the use could be de minimis, and if so, should
be a limiting factor in the calculation of damages."' The proper value to assign
for calculating damages from the infringement of a research tool is a difficult
analysis. "2 As the majority correctly noted, "The value to a licensee of research
tools lies, in part, in the point at which those tools are employed in the drug
development continuum."' " 3 Thus, a royalty on a tool that is used early in the
process would be less valuable than a key reagent that confirms or provides
proof of the entire concept.

109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 869-73 (remanding the case to the lower court for factual analysis of the financial
value of the RGD peptides to Merck's research).
112. Janis M. Mueller, No "DilettanteAffair": Rethinking the Experimental Use Exception
to PatentInfringementforBiomedicalResearch Tools, 76 WASH. L. REV. 1 (2001) (proposing
a broadened experimental use defense coupled with reasonable royalty calculations of future
value of later developed technology).
113. Integra Lifesciences,.331 F.3d at 871.
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A major problem with a royalty-based system is that it increases the overall
cost of research by stacking licensing fees for any given experimental approach.
This creates a significant dilemma for modem research labs reliant on an everincreasing number of patented research tools. 4 Because research labs survive
on a fixed budget of research grants, increasing royalty costs can determine the
scientific route that a particular investigator may be forced to pursue. Such
restraints on academic freedom and biomedical advancement run counter to the
core value of the patent system and are an unfortunate side effect of the current
research tool scheme.
The Integra opinion comes close to judicially creating a reasonable royalty
system for the unlicensed use of patented research tools. Such a solution has
previously been proposed and seems to have garnered moderate support;" 5
however, this system favors those who are commercially driven at the expense
of academia.
3. The Dissent'sPerspective Empties the Toolbox and Focuses on
Whether Research Concernsthe Patented Technology
Judge Newman's dissent relied on the presumption that Integra's patented
peptides were not research tools, but instead were, in themselves, patented
technology." 6 A close reading of the patents, however, suggests that the
technology is equally used as a research tool or as a means to its own end. 7 As
defined by the dissent, a "research tool is a product or method whose purpose
For Judge Newman, the ultimate
is use in the conduct of research.""'
distinction was that the "[u]se of an existing tool in one's research is quite
different from study of the tool itself." " 9 Nevertheless, it remains unclear where
the line between research tools and patented technology should be drawn.
Based on the knowledge Dr. Cheresh and his colleagues had contributed to
the field of cell adhesion interactions, the work performed under the ScrippsMerck agreement was directed toward the development of cancer therapeutics.
Thus, the same biological phenomenon underlies both the Integra patents and
the Scripps-Merck agreement. In essence, a researcher's early discovery in one
114. An alternate solution would be to make the acquisition of a patent on pure research
tools even more stringent through heightened, nonobviousness, and written description
requirements.
115. See, e.g., Mueller, supra note 112.
116. Integra Lifesciences, 331 F.3d at 877-78 (Newman, J., dissenting).
117. For example, the '621 patent states that "[this invention finds application in the
production of cell lines for research, in diagnosis and therapy, and the industrial production of
cellbiological products." U.S. Patent No. 4,988,621 (issued Jan. 29, 1991).
118. Integra Lifesciences, 331 F.3d at 878 (Newman, J., dissenting).
119. Id.
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area of scientific research is capable, if patented, to tie up future research in
tangential matters. Such bioprospecting remains particularly troublesome when
genes and proteins are involved in highly complex networks of action.
B. The Footnote Battle - A Death Blow ThroughDicta to the Experimental
Use Defense
Opposing footnotes in Integra reveal two distinct variations of the
experimental use defense after Madey. Although the majority opinion clearly
leans toward abandonment of the defense, confusion remains about its
application. Apparently, the majority did not abandon the defense, but instead,
changed the defense into a calculation of damages where truly minimal,
noncommercial use is exempted because it creates no harm. Therefore, under
the majority's reasoning, experimental use that does not result in profit will fail
to produce an actionable infringement. However, it is nearly impossible to
calculate profit from the use of a poorly defined research tool because of the
variety of ways it could affect the research being conducted.
1. Footnote Two Reiterates the Holding of Madey
As a consequence of Madey, Integra's footnote two draws attention to the
lingering issue of when and how to apply the experimental use defense. 2 °
Although the debate was seemingly over after Madey, Integra ensures the end
of the experimental use defense to patent infringement. Arguably, Judge Rader
and others in the patent law field doubted its existence in the first place. 2 '
Integra'smajority firmly indicates that the experimental use defense exists
only to the extent that it provides for de minimis infringement and calculation
of limited damages. However, the court suggests that any use could result in
damages, no matter how slight.'22 Thus, the focus is placed on the court's
proposed royalty calculation to provide relief when an infringer, even an
experimental researcher, uses the patented technology. By eliminating lawyers'
hair-splitting distinctions between research tools and technology, the majority's
holding has the potential to clarify the state of the law by focusing on whether
profit resulted from a tool's use. Unfortunately, academic scientists remain in
the precarious position of either electing upfront licenses, which entails multiple
legal constraints, or risking legal action at a later date. A better system would

120. Id. at 863-64 n.2.
121. Id. Merck never contended that the defense was applicable, even when given an
opportunity to do so at oral argument. Apparently, they abandoned the defense in light of the
Madey decision. Id.
122. Id. (paraphrasing Embrex, Inc. v. Serv. Eng'g Corp., 216 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2002)).
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provide immunity to academic researchers to facilitate research freedom and
increase the chance for innovation.
2. "Research on'" Versus "Researchwith" Amounts to a Distinction
Without Difference
Judge Newman sharply fired back with her own footnote, stating that Madey
was nothing more than "sweeping dictum" that failed to "distinguish between
investigation into patented things, as have always been permitted, and
investigation using patented things, as have never been permitted."' 23
Regardless of whether Judge Newman is correct, the problem of knowing where
the differences lie in the complexity of postgenomic research remains. In Judge
Newman's opinion, the court "disapprove[d] and essentially eliminate[d] the
common law research exemption . . . a change of law ill-suited to today's
research-founded, technology-based economy."' 24
Judge Newman highlighted a laundry list of research protocols performed
under the Scripps-Merck arrangement and drew the conclusion that the use of
the peptides in any of these assays was tantamount to research on the technology
of the peptides.2 5 A counter argument could be made, equally compatible with
the science involved, that the assays listed, and use of the peptides, were not
intended to study the peptides at all. Under this alternate explanation, the
Scripps-Merck research used the peptides to determine events downstream of
receptor binding, such as changes in intracellular biochemical activity. In other
words, the peptides were reagents to study the ultimate goal of manipulating
receptor functions and altering disease progression. The significance of this
choice of perspective between the second innovator and the patent owner
highlights that the topic is fraught with line-drawing. Ultimately, what one may
consider "research on," another may consider "research with," and significant
consequences flow from making such a determination.
3. Research Tool "FairUse": Solution or Same Old Confusion?
Recognizing the difficulties in identifying the boundaries of the experimental
use defense, 126Judge Newman suggested that an analogy to "fair use" in the area

123. Id. at 878 n.10 (Newman, J., dissenting).
124. Id. at 873 (Newman, J., dissenting).
125. Id. at 874 (Newman, J., dissenting).
126. Id. at 876 (Newman, J., dissenting) (recognizing that the "distinction between 'research'
and 'development,' as a matter of scale, creativity, resource allocation, and often the level of
scientific/engineering skill needed for the project," may be a useful route for drawing the
boundary of uses under experimental use).
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of copyrights may be a better solution.'2 7 The suggestion that legitimate fair use
of patented technology exists implies that researchers will recognize fair use of
a patent when they see it. This solution, however, seems to be nothing more
than giving a new name to an old problem.
Congress may have considered a fair use scheme in drafting § 271(e), as
evidenced by House Report comments highlighting the Subcommittee on the
Courts, the Internet and Intellectual Property's desire to "balance the need to
stimulate innovation against the goal of furthering the public interest."' 28 To
achieve this balance, Congress acknowledged that "U]ust as [it had] recognized
the doctrine of fair use in copyright, it was appropriate to create a similar
mechanism in the patent law."'29 However, the clear limitation of the safe
harbor provision in § 271 (e) to the unique situation of generic drug and device
approval suggests that Congress did not intend to broadly define a fair use test
in patents. Integradrew the line at discovery-based research, which leaves vast
amounts of research still vulnerable to liability for patent infringement without
an experimental use defense."
C. A Biomedical Research Tool "Safe Harbor"Provision CouldAlleviate
Tension
Given the demise of the experimental use defense subsequent to Madey and
Integra,the failure of the §271 (e)(1) safe harbor provision to reach down to the
level of experimental use, and the general lack of clarity on the subject,
Congress should take action to provide adequate protection for researchers.
This is particularly important at a time when the cost of research and
development of pharmaceuticals remains in the spotlight for health care reform.
1. Going "Down the Chain of Experimentation"
The majority and dissenting opinions agree that, as originally intended,
§ 271 (e)(1) does not reach far enough "down the chain of experimentation" to

127. The fair use defense in copyright law provides that limited copying of protected material
for purposes such as education, scholarship, or criticism will not be an act of infringement. 17
U.S.C. § 107 (2000).
128. H.R. REP. No. 98-857, at 30 (1984), reprintedin 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2647, 2714.
129. Id.
130. For an example of the scholarly argument in favor of a fair use exemption for genetic
sequence data to ensure equal access, see Donna M. Glitter, International Conflicts Over
PatentingHuman DNA Sequences in the United States and the European Union:An Argument
for Compulsory Licensing and a FairUse Exemption, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1623 (2001). There
is little reason to exclude other forms of biomedical information and discovery from such an
exemption.

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol57/iss2/6

2004]

NOTES

protect unlicensed use of the RGD peptides. 3 ' Rather, Congress clearly
articulated that it envisioned the provision to protect only the limited use of
patented drugs for bioequivalency studies to produce generic drugs ready for
competition with name-brand drugs at the end of the patented drug's term of
protection.'3 2 However, Judge Newman contended that the safe harbor
provision had been judicially extended to create a much broader protection
providing immunity for research, such as the Scripps-Merck collaboration.'33
Clearly, Congress never intended the provision to be a codification of whatever
remained of the common law experimental use defense after Roche.
2. The Next Logical Step in the Metamorphosis of Biomedical Research
Patent law already alters the landscape, or at least the perception, of
biomedical research. Biomedical research is no longer viewed as purely an
intellectual pursuit with results ultimately benefitting the common goal of
longer, healthier lives. Instead, if Madey is correct, biomedical research
constitutes a commercial endeavor geared toward fast track drug development.
This cynical approach undercuts those researchers who strive to expand
knowledge for the sake of knowing. The economic nature of the Madey
decision, however, reflects a modern reality that must be dealt with to ensure
continued progress.
As long as the patent office remains content to grant patents for biomedical
research tools far upstream of end-product innovations, scientists would be
foolish not to pursue such rewards for their efforts. Thus, a system must be
created to ensure that those patents do not stifle progress and defeat the entire
endeavor. Given the state of confusion in the courts, Congress should act by
codifying an experimental use defense, which would begin to alleviate the
confusion.
3. A Codified Experimental Use Defense Would Protect the Public Interest
in Efficient Biomedical Research and Innovation
A significant need exists to protect access to innovations and research tools
as postgenomic medicine and interconnected biological processes become more
apparent. The human genome is now known and scientists are turning their
attention to uncovering the sequence and function of all human proteins. " The

131. Integra Lifesciences, 331 F.3d at 877 (Newman, J., concurring in part). "The safe
harbor does not reach any exploratory research that may rationally form a predicate for future
FDA clinical trials." Id. at 867.
132. H.R. REP. No. 98-857, at 8, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2692.
133. Integra Lifesciences, 331 F.3d at 877.
134. "The term 'proteome' is often used to describe the total set of proteins expressed during
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vast array of available knowledge cannot be locked up in patents at the expense
of future drug developments or advancements in knowledge. The current system
blocks access by threatening infringement litigation whenever scientists'
research takes them into the path of another scientist's patented tool.
Public policy, and indeed the fundamental principles underlying the patent
system, place a premium on effective and efficient technological progress,
particularly when taxpayer-derived grants pay for much of the new innovation
at the early stages of discovery. Accordingly, Congress has the motive and
authority to step in and clarify the ownership and ability to use patents. What
is necessary is a definitive statement that experimental use of research tools,
particularly in an academic environment, must be exempt from infringement
liability when it is one piece of an intricate advancement in science. A safe
harbor for the use of research tools, along with clearer guidelines to prevent the
overpatenting of biological processes and products, would allow scientists to
focus more on research and less on legal hurdles.
VI. Conclusion
Recent Federal Circuit decisions reveal that the experimental use defense has
at least one foot in the grave, and may in fact be entirely sealed in a coffin.
Consequently, researchers are faced with the difficult choice of pursuing their
intellectual curiosity or giving it up because the needed tools are beyond their
reach. This sort of cost-benefit analysis has no place in academic science, and
Congress should create a safe harbor provision in the patent laws that truly
protects the experimental use of technology and the tools required to solve the
riddles of molecular medicine.
Melissa J.Alcorn, Ph.D.

the lifetime of a cell." Keala Chan & Dennis Fernandez, Patents in Proteomics: Possibilities
andPrecautions,22 BIOTECHNOLOGY L. REP. 273, 274 (2003). For an article discussing issues
related to proteomics and patent rights, see generally id.
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